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Abstract: Most statisticians are aware that probability models interpreted in a
frequentist manner are not really true in objective reality, but only idealisations.
I argue that this is often ignored when actually applying frequentist methods
and interpreting the results, and that keeping up the awareness for the essential
difference between reality and models can lead to a more appropriate use and in-
terpretation of frequentist models and methods, called frequentism-as-model. This
is elaborated showing connections to existing work, appreciating the special role of
i.i.d. models and subject matter knowledge, giving an account of how and under
what conditions models that are not true can be useful, giving detailed interpreta-
tions of tests and confidence intervals, confronting their implicit compatibility logic
with the inverse probability logic of Bayesian inference, re-interpreting the role of
model assumptions, appreciating robustness, and the role of “interpretative equiv-
alence” of models. Epistemic (often referred to as Bayesian) probability shares
the issue that its models are only idealisations and not really true for modelling
reasoning about uncertainty, meaning that it does not have an essential advantage
over frequentism, as is often claimed. Bayesian statistics can be combined with
frequentism-as-model, leading to what Gelman and Hennig (2017) call “falsifica-
tionist Bayes”.
Key Words: foundations of statistics, Bayesian statistics, interpretational equiv-
alence, compatibility logic, inverse probability logic, misspecification testing, sta-
bility, robustness
1 Introduction
The frequentist interpretation of probability and frequentist inference such as hy-
pothesis tests and confidence intervals have been strongly criticised recently (e.g.,
Hajek (2009); Diaconis and Skyrms (2018); Wasserstein et al. (2019)). In applied
statistics they are still in very widespread use, and in theoretical statistics the
number of still appearing new works based on frequentist principles is probably
not lower than that of any competing approach to statistics.
1
1 INTRODUCTION 2
Even defenders of frequentist statistics such as Mayo (2018) admit that frequen-
tist inference is often misinterpreted, while arguing that such misinterpretation is
a major source of unfair criticism of frequentism. By and large I agree with this.
Here I will present a view of frequentist probability and inference that, as I will
argue, avoids many issues that critics have raised, and allows for a better un-
derstanding of how results of frequentist inference can be interpreted. I call this
view “frequentism-as-model”. It is based on the idea (elaborated in Hennig (2010)
and sketched in Section 3.1) that mathematical models are essentially different
from “reality” and should be used and their results interpreted always keeping
this difference in mind.
The insight that probability models are remote from reality was expressed by
de Finetti (1974) (“probability does not exist”) and Box (1979) (“all models are
wrong but some are useful”). Most statisticians would probably agree with the
idea that probability models will not match how reality “really is”. But much
communication and even thought about statistics is misleading in this respect,
for example the idea that it is possible to check and ultimately fulfill statistical
model assumptions (which implies that models can be true after all). Having de
Finetti’s and Box’s quote in mind can be a useful reminder of the difference between
models and reality, but I think they are themselves problematic. Box implies that
the distinction between a true and a wrong model is a meaningful one, which I
doubt, given that models operate on a different domain from observer-independent
reality, see Section 3.1. De Finetti argued that, given that objective/frequentist
probabilities do not exist, subjective (Bayesian) probability should be preferred,
conveniently ignoring that using probability calculus to model personal uncertainty
comes with the same modelling issue, namely that the model operates on a domain
different from what is modelled. I will argue that this issue ultimately affects all
probability modelling. Ultimately my position is pluralist and I do not claim
general superiority of a frequentist over a Bayesian view, but I hold that there
is a place and a use in science for frequentist probability models and inference,
appropriately understood as frequentism-as-model.
Here are some influences and important ideas from the literature. Readers
with a philosophical background may find similarities of my position with the
“long run propensity” interpretation of probability by Gillies (2000) (Chapter 7).
Gillies abandons the typically frequentist operational connection between proba-
bilities and “real” infinite sequences, and just postulates that real propensities may
behave like random numbers generated by probability models, which can be prob-
abilistically falsified. Although his outlook is more traditionally realist than mine
(see Section 3.1), I find this interpretation very much in line with how frequentist
statisticians actually reason. Hacking (1975) suggested the term “aleatory” for
probability interpretations such as frequentism and propensities, where probabili-
ties refer to the data generation in the real world.
Tukey (1997) re-interpreted the role of frequentist models in statistical infer-
ence as “challenges” that procedures have to face in order to show that they are
worthwhile in a given situation. He recommended using “bouquets of alternative
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challenges” to investigate how well a procedure may work in a real situation, in-
cluding worst cases, rather than finding an optimal procedure for a single model.
He wrote “(more honest foundations of data analysis) have to include not assuming
that we always know what in fact we never know – the exact probability struc-
ture involved”, and further “almost nothing is harder than verifying a stochastic
assumption, something I find hard to believe has ever been done in even a single
instance.” Many different models can be compatible with the same situation, and
it is often misleading to base an analysis on just one model.
Davies (2014)’s view of statistical models is similar: “The problem is how to
relate a given data set and a given model. Models in statistics are, with some
exceptions, ad hoc, although not arbitrary, and so should be treated consistently
as approximations and not as truth. I believe there is a true but unknown amount
of copper in a sample of water, but I do not believe that there is a true but
unknown parameter value. Nor am I prepared to behave as if there were a true
but unknown parameter value, here put in inverted commas as statisticians often
do to demonstrate that they do not actually believe that there is such a thing.
Moreover the model has to be an approximation to the data and not to some
true but unknown generating mechanism. There may well be some physical truth
behind the data but this will be many orders of magnitude more complex than
anything that can be reasonably modelled by a probability measure. Furthermore
there will be a different truth behind every single observation. (. . . ) The definition
of approximation used in this book is that a model is an adequate approximation
to a data set if typical data generated under the model look like the real data.”
Again this implies that many different models can be adequate approximations of
the same data. In line with Davies, in the following, the term “probability model”
will denote a well defined family of distributions; sometimes this will refer to the
special case of just a single distribution, i.e., both the set of Gaussian distributions
{N (µ, σ2) : µ ∈ IR, σ2 ∈ IR+}, and a single distribution with fixed values for µ
and σ2, will be called “model”.
A key issue in Davies’s concept is whether the real data to be analysed can be
distinguished, in a sense to be defined by the choice of an appropriate statistic,
from typical data sets generated by the model. I will refer to this as “compatibility
logic”. It does not require any postulation of “truth” for the model. Although
Davies stated that his approach is neither frequentist nor Bayesian, I interpret it
as frequentist in the sense that models are taken as data generators that can in
principle produce an arbitrarily large amount of data sets with resulting relative
frequencies that roughly correspond to the modelled probabilities.
Whereas I mostly agree with Davies, my focus is more on interpretation and
what we can learn from probabilistic modelling, and as opposed to Davies I can
see an interpretation of Bayesian inverse probability logic that is in line with
frequentism-as-model, see Section 5.2.
In Section 2 I define what I mean by frequentism-as-model. In Section 3 con-
cerns the connection between frequentism-as-model and reality, first summarising
my general view on mathematical models and reality, then explaining how sta-
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tistical models can be useful dealing with reality without implying that they are
true or even, in a well defined sense, close to being true (Davies’s “approximation”
regards closeness to the observed data, not to any underlying truth). Section 4
treats statistical inference based on frequentism-as-model, including the role of
model assumptions, robustness and stability, and the key concept of “interpreta-
tional equivalence”. In Section 5 I will explore Bayesian statistics in relation to
frequentism-as-model. First I discuss the charges of proponents of epistemic inter-
pretations of probability against frequentism, and to what extent frequentism-as-
model can be useful in ways not covered by epistemic probabilities. Then I will
explain how Bayesian inverse probability logic can be used in a way compatible
with frequentism-as-model, in the spirit of what we have called “falsificationist
Bayes” in Gelman and Hennig (2017). Compatibility logic (as inherent in, e.g.,
statistical tests) and Bayesian inverse probability logic will be compared in the
light of frequentism-as-model. Section 6 has a concluding discussion.
2 What is frequentism-as-model?
In Section 2.1, I will explain frequentism-as-model. In order to understand its
implications, the role of i.i.d. models and subject matter information is discussed
in Section 2.2.
2.1 Frequentism-as-model as interpretation of probability
Frequentism-as-model is an interpretation of probability, by which I mean a way to
connect the mathematical definition of probability to our concept and perception
of reality.
To make distinctions clearer, “traditional” frequentism is an interpretation of
probability as well, and this does in my view not include what is often seen as
methods of frequentist inference such as tests and confidence intervals. These are
normally motivated assuming a frequentist interpretation of probability, but hold-
ing a frequentist interpretation of probability does not make using these methods
mandatory. An alternative to frequentism is epistemic probability, interpreted
as expressing the level of uncertainty of either an individual or a group about
events; often logical/objective and subjective epistemic interpretations are dis-
tinguished. Epistemic probability is an interpretation of probability, whereas I
understand Bayesian statistics as statistics involving Bayes’ theorem and reason-
ing based prior and posterior probabilities. This is often, but not always, done
based on an epistemic interpretation of probability, and is therefore not in itself
an interpretation of probability. See Gillies (2000); Galavotti (2005) for overviews
of interpretations of probability.
I do not think that the adoption of one interpretation of probability in one sit-
uation should preclude a statistician from using another interpretation in another
situation. A statistician can be a frequentist when analysing a randomised trial to
compare a new drug with a placebo, and adopt a logical epistemic approach when
2 WHAT IS FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL? 5
computing a probability that an accused is really the murderer, and in this sense
she can be a pluralist. However, if in a single analysis the implied interpretation
of probability is not clear, results in terms of probability do not have a meaning.
Frequentism-as-model is a flavour of frequentism in the sense that a probability
of an event A refers to the limiting relative frequency for observing A under ide-
alised infinite repetition of a random experiment with possible outcome A. There
are substantial problems with frequentism. It is hard to define what a “random ex-
periment” is in reality. In the following I will generally use the term “experiment”
for a situation that is modelled as potentially having several different outcomes
to which probabilities are assigned. One of the central proponents of frequentism,
von Mises (1939), tried to ensure the random character of sequences by enforcing
relative frequency limits to be constant under certain place selection rules for ex-
tracting a subsequence from the infinite sequence of experiments. His and other
attempts have been criticised by the lack of connection of both the hypothesised
limit and the definition of admissible sequences to observed relative frequencies in
finite sequences, which are the only ones we can observe (see, e.g., Hajek (2009);
Diaconis and Skyrms (2018)).
Von Mises and most other frequentists claim that their conception is applicable
to experiments allowing for lots of (idealised infinitely many, idealised identical)
repetitions, but in fact in standard frequentist probability modelling such repeti-
tions are modelled as identically and independently distributed (i.i.d.), meaning
that a whole sequence of repetitions is modelled by a single probability model,
modelling probabilities not only for the outcomes of a single replicate, but for
combinations of outcomes of some or all replicates. Central results of probability
theory such as the laws of large numbers and the central limit theorem apply to
such models. Applying the traditional frequentist interpretation of probability to
them would require whole independent and potentially infinite sequences to be
repeated, which of course is impossible.
Frequentism-as-model deals with these issues in two ways. Firstly, it empha-
sises that probability is a model and as such fundamentally different from observed
reality. Adopting frequentism-as-model means to think about an experiment or a
situation as if it were generated by a frequentist process, temporarily, without im-
plying that this really is the case. This means that it is not required to make a case
that the experiment is really infinitely or even very often repeatable and will really
lead to the implied relative frequencies. Particularly this means that all available
observations can be modelled as i.i.d. without having to postulate that the whole
sequence of observations can be infinitely repeated. Obviously, insisting on the
fundamental difference between model and reality in this way raises the question
how we can use such a model to learn something useful about reality, which I will
discuss in Section 3.2. Von Mises and other frequentists already acknowledged
that frequentist probabilities are idealisations. To me it seems, however, that
in traditional frequentism this is only a response to critics, and that otherwise
it does not have consequences regarding data analyses and their interpretations.
Frequentism-as-model is different, as elaborated below.
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Secondly, whereas it is not clear how to connect the limits of traditional fre-
quentist infinite sequences to an observed finite amount of real data as any limit
is invariant against arbitrary changes of any finite beginning of a sequence, i.i.d.
models, as well as models with other fully specified dependence and non-identity
structures, make probability statements about finite sequences of observations,
and these can be checked against the actual observations. It can be found out if
and in which sense the observed sequence would have been “typical” according
to the specified model. In fact, whereas we may not be able to observe another
real data sequence of the same length, and surely not arbitrarily many, we are
able to generate an almost arbitrary number of repetitions of sequences from the
model involving just the light idealisation that we would need a perfect random
number generator. Even without a random number generator, in many situations
probability theory can tell us what to expect if the model holds. This resonates
with Gillies’s long run propensity interpretation of probability, where probabilities
are not defined referring to infinite sequences, but rather as tendencies to observe
in finite experiments a “typical” (i.e., large probability) outcome as specified by
the model.
An issue with this is the definition of “typical”. For example, assuming an i.i.d
Bernoulli model, a sequence that has 50 zeroes, then 50 ones, then 50 zeroes, than
50 ones again, and so on (called 50-50-sequence in the following), has the same
probability as a randomly looking sequence of zeroes and ones that gives us no
intuitive reason to doubt the i.i.d. assumption. On what basis can we claim that
the i.i.d. model is adequate (to use Davies’s terminology) for the latter sequence
but not for the 50-50-sequence? This requires subjective researcher input. The
researcher needs to decide about the specific way, or ways, in which a sequence
has to be typical according to the model in order for the model to be “adequate”.
For example, the researcher may decide that the model is only useful for data in
which the lengths of “runs” of zeroes or ones in a row are not longer to what is
expected under the model, in which case the model will be ruled out for the 50-50-
sequence (which can be formally done using the runs test, Lehmann (1986), p.176),
whereas the irregular sequence will count as typical. A reason for such a decision
may be that the researcher may think that sequences with long runs of the same
outcome are better modelled by models involving positive dependence between the
individual binary experiments, and that under such models it can be shown that
the method of analysis the researcher would want to apply to an i.i.d. Bernoulli
sequence will be misleading. This could for example be a confidence interval for
the probability of observing a one. Keeping in mind the fundamental difference
between model and reality, the researcher in this situation does not make a decision
about which model she believes is in fact true. For such a belief, the subjective
decision to distinguish between two sequences of same individual probability may
look questionable. The actual decision is rather about case-dependent criteria
regarding in terms of what model she wants to think when analysing the data,
informed by the aim of data analysis as well as the characteristics of potential
alternative models. Note though that if the researcher uses the runs test as decision
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rule, she will never be able to observe a 50-50-sequence whenever she uses the i.i.d.
Bernoulli model, under which such sequences should actually be possible. This is
an instance of the “misspecification paradox”, see Section 4.3.
Probability theory offers ways to help the researcher making such decisions, by
for example addressing questions of the form “If indeed the model is as assumed,
how likely is it to decide against it; or if a different model is true, how likely is
it to not detect it and wrongly stick to the original one; and how bad would the
consequences of such an erroneous decision be in terms of the probability of getting
a misleading result of the final analysis?” The researcher may also decide to adopt
a more robust final method of analysis in order to deal appropriately with a larger
number of models between which the data cannot distinguish.
By always keeping in mind that reality is only treated temporarily as if gen-
erated by a certain model, not ruling out the possibility that it could be different
(for which we may consider different models), and even taking this possibility
into account when making further data analytic decisions, frequentism-as-model
takes the fundamental difference between model and reality much more seriously
into account than a standard frequentist analysis, in which a model is used and
normally no longer questioned after some potential initial checks. This leads to
interpretations of the final results that often seem to naively imply that the model
is true, even if the researcher using such an approach may well admit, when asked
explicitly, that reality actually differs from the model.
2.2 The role of i.i.d. models and subject-matter knowledge
Thinking about reality as if it were generated by a certain probability model has
implications. A critical discussion of these implications is a way to decide about
whether or not to adopt a certain model, temporarily, and on top of this it bears
the potential to learn about the real situation. If a sequence is thought of as gen-
erated by an i.i.d. process, it means that the individual experiments are treated
as identical and independent. De Finetti made the point that whatever can be
distinguished is not identical. Treating experiments as identical in frequentism-as-
model does not mean that the researcher believes that they are really identical,
and neither do they have to be really identical in order to license the application
of such a model. Rather it implies that the differences between the individual
experiments are temporarily ignored or, equivalently, treated as irrelevant; analo-
gously, using an independence model does not mean that the researcher believes
that experiments are really independent in reality, but rather that she assesses
potential sources of dependence as irrelevant to what she wants to do and how she
wants to interpret the result. Of course, depending on what kind and strength of
dependence can be found in reality, this may be inappropriate. On such grounds,
the model can be criticised based on subject-matter knowledge, and may be re-
vised. This allows for a discussion about whether the model is appropriate, on top
of possible checks against the data, which may have a low power detecting certain
deviations from an i.i.d. model.
2 WHAT IS FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL? 8
I.i.d. models, and their Bayesian counterpart, exchangeability models, play an
important role in frequentism-as-model as well as in applied statistics in general.
Of course many non-i.i.d. models are used such as regression where the response
distribution is non-identical depending on the explanatory variables, and models
for time series or spacial dependence. Even those models will normally have an
i.i.d. element, such as i.i.d. residuals or innovations, be it conditional in a Bayesian
setup. This is not an accident. Treating experiments as identical and independent
(or having regular and fully specified dependence or non-identity structures that
will usually involve an i.i.d. element) specifies how an observation from one exper-
iment can be used for learning about another, which is the core aim of statistics.
Statistics relies on models that allow us to use different observations to accumulate
information. This particularly means that the statistician will need to make deci-
sions to ignore certain potential irregular differences or dependencies in order to
be able to do her job, regardless of whether her position is frequentism-as-model,
traditional frequentism, or an epistemic Bayesian approach. Obviously i.i.d. mod-
els do not necessarily lead to convincing results, and ultimately it is a matter of
experience and practical success in what situations the use of these models is ap-
propriate. Note in particular that it is possible with a sufficiently large amount
of data to distinguish, with large probability, i.i.d. data from data with a regular
dependence structure such as ARIMA. It is however not possible to distinguish
i.i.d. data from arbitrarily irregular structures of dependence or non-identity. A
model that states that the first observation is random but conditionally on it all
further observations are fixed with probability one can never be ruled out based on
the data alone, and subject-matter arguments are required to make a reasonably
regular model plausible.
At the stage of analysis, both checking of adequacy based on the data and un-
derstanding and discussion of the subject matter background are of crucial impor-
tance. The charge of an ignorance of subject-matter information that Bayesians of-
ten raise against frequentists does not affect frequentism-as-model. On the flipside,
frequentism-as-model obviously relies on subjective decisions of the researchers, so
that a statistician holding it cannot proudly claim that analyses are fully objec-
tive, as some frequentists and objective Bayesians like to do, which is questionable
anyway (Gelman and Hennig (2017)).
As an example for subject-matter arguments, in a much-cited and influential
study that prompted a Lancet editorial (Lancet (2005)) with the title “The end
of homeopathy”, Shang et al. (2005) carried out a meta-analysis of eight studies
comparing homeopathy with a placebo using a standard meta-analysis model with
a random study effect assumed i.i.d. They found that there is no evidence that
the odds ratio between “homeopathy works” and “placebo works” is different from
one and concluded (not inappropriately) that “this finding is compatible with the
notion that the clinical effects of homeopathy are placebo effects.”
Here are two implications of the i.i.d. model for the random study effect.
Firstly, modelling it as identically distributed implies that the differences between
studies are attributed to random variation, which basically means that knowledge
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of known differences between the studies is ignored for modelling. This particularly
includes differences between different modes of applying homeopathy. For example,
there were only two studies used in the meta-analysis in which homeopathy was
applied in the classical way with individual repertorisation, which is seen as the
only proper way of applying homeopathy by many homeopaths. Modelling the
study effect of these studies as coming from the same distribution as all the other
study effects may be justifiable if there is an a priori belief that homeopathy
basically is a placebo and the differences between application modes are irrelevant,
but it is not suitable for convincing skeptical supporters of classical homeopathy
who would be willing to accept a fair study.
Secondly, an expected value of 0 of the random effect is not assumed for every
single study, but over all studies, with a potentially arbitrary large between-studies
variance. This implies that the effective sample size for estimating the odds ratio
is not the number of individual patients treated in all studies (several thousands),
but the number of studies, n = 8, and n = 2 for classical homeopathy only, which
the authors may use to justify their decision to not make a modelling difference
between different modes of applying homeopathy, selected by Shang et al. (2005)
by a study quality criterion. The power of the resulting test is therefore very low,
and consequently the confidence interval that the authors give for the odds ratio is
very wide. This argument applies to meta-analyses with a random effect generally;
in the literature one can sometimes find the informal remark that such analyses
require a large number of studies, see Kulinskaya et al. (2008). On top of that
it could be discussed whether there may be reasons for assuming systematic bias
over all studies, which in the model would amount to a nonzero expectation of the
random effect.
Obviously n = 8 is not sufficient to check the i.i.d.-assumption for the random
study effect at any reasonable power. Rather than having any connection to an
observable “truth”, the random effect is a convenient modelling device where in-
dividual study effects cannot be ignored, but the implications above are usually
ignored.
Given this, it looks very dubious that the Lancet (2005)’s issue editorial con-
cluded: “Surely the time has passed for selective analyses, biased reports, or further
investment in research to perpetuate the homeopathy versus allopathy debate.”
Regarding the purely statistical evidence, the study itself could as well be used to
argue that there are not yet enough studies.
In principle such discussions can also take place regarding the traditional fre-
quentist use of models. but frequentism-as-model re-frames these discussions in a
helpful way. I makes us aware of the implicit meaning of the model assumptions,
which can be sued to discuss them. And it emphasises that what has to be decided
is not the truth of the model, but rather a balance between the capacity of the
model to enable learning from the existing observations about future observations
or underlying mechanisms on one hand, and on the other hand taking into account
all kinds of peculiarities that may be present in the real situation of interest, but
that may be hard to incorporate in such a model - even though they may have
3 FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL AND REALITY 10
more or less strong impact on the results.
A key aspect is that rather than thinking in binary terms about whether a
model is true or not, frequentism-as-model implies that the connection between
observed reality and models can be assessed gradually as more or less close. It is
neither impossible nor inadmissible to conceive a situation as a random experiment
that cannot or only a very limited number of times be repeated, and to use a model
in the sense of frequentism-as-model for it. This would imply to think of the
situation as hypothetically repeatable, and of certain outcomes having a certain
tendency, or, in standard philosophical terms, propensity to happen, which would
materialise in case of repetition, but not in reality.
Therefore frequentism-as-model does not bar single-case probabilities as von
Mises’s flavour of frequentism does. But it is more difficult for the person who puts
up such a model to convincingly justify it compared to a situation in which there
are what is interpreted as “replicates”. Convincing justification is central due to
the central role of communication and agreement for science in the philosophy
outlined above. Whatever the model is used for, it must be taken into account
that hypothesised values of the single-case probability cannot be checked against
data. This changes if the experiment is embedded in a set of experiments that
are not directly seen as repetitions of each other, but for which an assumption
is made that their results are put together from systematic components and an
error term, and the latter is interpreted as i.i.d. repetition. This is actually done in
standard frequentist regression analyses, in which the x is often assumed fixed. For
a given set of explanatory variables x a distribution for the response y is implied,
despite the fact that the random experiment can in reality not be repeated for any
given x in situations in which the researcher cannot control the x. Insisting on
repeatability for the existence of traditional frequentist probabilities would imply
that nothing real corresponds to the distribution of y for fixed x, and there is no
way to check any probability model. The unobservable i.i.d. error term constructs
repeatability artificially, but I have never seen this mentioned anywhere. From a
frequentism-as-model perspective this needs to be acknowledged, and dependent
on the situation it may be seen as appropriate or inappropriate, once more using
information from the data and about the subject matter background, but there
is nothing essentially wrong or particularly suspicious about it, apart from the
fact that it turns out that our possibilities to test model assumptions are quite
generally more limited than many might think, see Section 4.3.
3 Frequentism-as-model and reality
Given the separation between reality and model in frequentism-as-model, using
such methods to address real problems requires justification. Before this is ad-
dressed in Section 3.2, I will summarise my general ideas about how mathematical
models related to reality in Section 3.1.
3 FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL AND REALITY 11
3.1 Mathematical models and reality
I wrote Hennig (2010) mainly out of the conviction that the debate about the foun-
dations of statistics often suffers from the lack of a general account of mathematical
models and their relation to reality.
On the frequentist side often a rather naive connection between the models
and reality is postulated, which is then often criticised by advocates of epistemic
probability, implying that because this does not work, probability should better
be about human uncertainty rather than directly about the reality of interest. But
modelling human uncertainty is still modelling, and similarly naive ideas of how
such models relate to “real” human uncertainty are problematic in similar ways.
More about this in Section 5.1.
In Hennig (2010) I have argued that mathematical models are thought con-
structs and means of communication about reality. I have distinguished “observer-
independent (or objective) reality”, “personal reality” (the view of reality con-
structed by an individual observer and basis for their actions), and “social reality”
(the view of reality constructed by communication between observers). I have
argued from a constructivist perspective that implies that observer-independent
reality is not accessible directly for human observers, and that, if we want to talk
about reality in a meaningful way, it makes sense to refer to personal and social
reality, which are accessible by the individual, a social group, respectively, rather
than only to observer-independent reality. Observer-independent reality manifests
itself primarily in the generally shared experience that neither an individual ob-
server nor a social system can construct their reality however they want; we all
face resistance from reality. This resonates with Chang (2012)’s “Active Scientific
Realism”: “I take reality as whatever is not subject to one’s will, and knowledge as
an ability to act without being frustrated by resistance from reality. This perspec-
tive allows an optimistic rendition of the pessimistic induction, which celebrates
the fact that we can be successful in science without even knowing the truth. The
standard realist argument from success to truth is shown to be ill-defined and
flawed.”
In Hennig (2010) I interpret mathematical models as a particular form of social
reality, based on the idea that mathematics is a particular form of communication
that aims at being free of ambiguity, and that enables absolute agreement by means
of proofs. Science is seen as a social endeavour aiming at general agreement about
aspects of the world, for which unambiguous mathematical communication should
be obviously useful. This comes to the price that mathematics needs to unify
potentially diverging personal and social observations and constructions. There
is no guarantee that by doing so mathematical models come closer to observer-
independent reality; in fact, this view sees the domain of mathematics as distinct
from the domain of observer-independent reality. The connection is that the con-
structs of personal and social reality are affected by “perturbation” (or, as Chang
puts it, “resistance”) from observer-independent reality, and it can be hoped that
such perturbation, if observed in sufficiently related ways by different individuals
3 FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL AND REALITY 12
and social systems, can be represented in mathematical modelling, which then
allows to analyse the represented reality using the machinery of mathematics and
logic. There is also repercussion of communication, including mathematics, on
social and personal constructions of reality. Mathematical modelling has an effect
on the world view and dealings with the world of social systems and individuals.
We can hope for this effect to be beneficial, but this may not always be the case,
because important subtleties and differences between individual and social realities
may be lost in mathematics.
The constructivism I adhere to is these days rather unpopular in philosophy,
and what Chang refers to as “standard realism” in his quote above has won some
ground. However, given the rather tedious controversy that philosophers have
about the objective “existence” of long run frequentist or single-event chances and
propensities (see Eagle (2019)), it seems as attractive as ever to me to treat them
as a thought construct and to look at how they are used and how they relate to
observations in order to circumvent the enormous amount of problems that come
with postulating the objective “existence” of such a thing.
3.2 How is frequentism-as-model useful?
From Section 3.1 it follows that the separation between reality and model is a gen-
eral feature of mathematical models, not an exclusive one of frequentism-as-model,
although frequentism-as-model acknowledges it explicitly. The question “how is
frequentism-as-model useful, and how is it connected to reality?” is therefore con-
nected with the general question how mathematical models can be useful, even
if “wrong” in Box’s terms. The way to use mathematical models is obviously to
take the mathematical objects that are involved in the model as representations
of either perceived or theoretically implied aspects of reality; and then to use this
to interpret the results of using the models.
In order for the model to be useful, does not reality have to be “somehow”
like the model? According to the constructivist view in Section 3.1, reality is
accessible only through personal perception and communication, so the best we
can hope for is that the model can correspond to how we perceive, communicate,
and think about reality. Regarding frequentism-as-model, this concerns in the
first place the concept of i.i.d. repetition, see Section 2.2. As follows from there,
i.i.d. repetition is a thought construct and not an objective reality; however, even
apart from probability modelling it is easy to see how much of our world-view even
before any science relies on the idea of repetition, be it the cycles of day and night
and the seasons, or be it the expectation, out of experience, of roughly the same
behaviour or even roughly the same distribution of behaviours when observing
any kind of recurring process as diverse as what a baby needs to do to attract the
attention of the parents, look, size, and edibility of plants of the same species, or
any specific industrial production process. Objections against the truth of “i.i.d”
can be easily constructed for observations in all of these examples, yet analysing
them in terms of i.i.d. models often gives us insight, new ideas, and practical
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competence to deal with these processes, be it with additional ingredients such
as explanatory variables, regular dependence structures, or seasonal components.
Ultimately the success of probability modelling has to be evaluated empirically,
relative to researchers’ aims, and obviously the result will sometimes, but not
always, be positive. I remain agnostic regarding to what extent positive results
confirm that “objective reality really is like that”, to which there ultimately is no
answer beyond what occurs in personal and social reality.
A major general reason for using probability models is that they allow us to
quantify random variation. It is not an accident that probability theory is a rela-
tively young branch of mathematics. Unlike most historically older mathematical
modelling, probability modelling is essentially not only about what was, is, or will
be observed, but also about what could have been observed but was not and/or will
not be observed. The latter does not and will not exist as observation. Connect-
ing this to observations is tricky and in my view a major reason why probability
models are so controversial and problematic. But they allow us to deal with a
concept that was hardly acknowledged when probability theory emerged, and be-
came hugely influential, namely the distinction between a meaningful pattern and
meaningless variation.
What can be done in order to support useful and avoid misleading results
of probability modelling interpreted as frequentism-as-model? Below are some
questions that need to be addressed. These questions are not very surprising, and
statisticians, be they traditional frequentists, Bayesians, or something else, may
think that they address these anyway. What makes frequentism-as-model different
is that a standard approach would be to take these issues into account when setting
up and justifying the model, and then all further analysis and interpretation is done
conditionally on the model being true. In frequentism-as-model there is no such
thing as a true model, meaning that the issues below need to be kept in mind,
and they still play a role when running model-based analyses and interpreting the
results.
(1) Is the model compatible with the data? I will discuss in more detail in
Section 4.
(2) How does the model relate to subject matter knowledge? Themodel
should be informed by perceptions and ideas (subject matter knowledge,
which is not necessarily “objective”) regarding the real process to be mod-
elled, such as specific reasons for dependence, non-identity, or also for or
against particular distributional shapes such as symmetry. Just to give an
example, dependence by having the same teacher and communication be-
tween students makes the use of an i.i.d. model for analysing student results
for students from the same class or even school suspicious, and it can be con-
troversially discussed to what extent introducing dependence only in form of
an additive random effect addresses this appropriately.
(3) What is the aim of modelling? Probability models are used in different
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ways, and this is important for how to set them up. Although the aim
of modelling is not always ignored in traditional frequentist or Bayesian
analysis, there is a general tendency to think that the ultimate aim is always
to find the true model, and if this (or at least a model as “close” as possible
to it) is found, everything “relevant” that can be known is known. This is
fundamentally different from the attitude implied by frequentism-as-model.
Cox (1990) lists three different classes of modelling aims, namely “substantive
models”, which model causal mechanisms that the researcher is interested
in, “empirical models”, which try to aid inference about relations between
variables such as effect sizes, without making an attempt at reconstructing
how the relations work in any detail, and “indirect models”, where models
are not directly connected with a real situation. This encompasses the use of
models for deriving or comparing methodology, but also, in a real situation
but only indirectly serving the main aim of analysis, things such as the
imputation of missing values. The classes may be mixed or intermediate in
some specific situations.
This has methodological consequences. Substantive models may have as-
pects that are there for representing the researcher’s view but may refer to
unobservables, in which case they cannot or in the best case very indirectly
be tested against the data. A substantive model may even be there to com-
municate a researcher’s view without the ambition to fit any data. It may at
times represent scenarios that are seen as best or worst cases, intentionally
not modelling what is seen as most realistic. Parsimony may be a strong
concern if the model is used to communicate an idea, a weaker concern if the
model is used for prediction, and no concern at all if the model is used to
simulate data for exploring potential future variation in a complex system.
In some cases the major use of the model is learning from discovering its lack
of fit and the exploration of reasons.
At first sight is seems central for of empirical models to fit the data. But also
for such models the specific modelling aim is important, because deviations
of the data from what would be typical for the model are only a problem to
the extent that they raise the danger of misleading results, which depends
on what kind of result the researcher is after, e.g., modelling integer number
data by a normal distribution is not normally a problem if inference about
means is required, at least not as long as the i.i.d. assumption is implied and
the distributional shape is not strongly skew or with large outliers, both of
which can happen with continuous data as well.
A major indirect use of models is the investigation of properties of inference
methods by theory or simulation. For example, maximum likelihood esti-
mators can be seen as inspired by probability models that are interpreted in
a frequentism-as-model sense: “Imagine a real situation as modelled, then
the ML estimator makes the data most likely”. The major aim of modelling
there is to find a good method for estimation. Even many Bayesians use
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models with an implicit frequentist interpretation in methodological work
in order to investigate the quality of their methods in a situation with a
constructed known truth. It could be argued that in order for such work to
be applicable to objective reality, objective reality has to be as the model
specifies, but if we accept that “all models are wrong” in objective reality,
there is no better alternative than studying the behaviour of method under
such a model. Simulations and theory will seem more relevant if the used
models seem “realistic”, but as long as the aim is not to address a very spe-
cific application, models used in this way are not checked against data. This
only can happen when the resulting methods are applied, see Section 4.3.
Furthermore, for some modelling aims there are methods that can more or
less directly measure how well the aim is fulfilled. A major example is cross-
validation for prediction quality. If prediction is the major modelling aim,
good cross-validation results can be seen as dominating other concerns such
as fit of the existing data or correspondence with subject matter knowl-
edge. Breiman (2001) argued that if prediction quality is a major aim, the
approach to model the data generating process is often inferior to using
non-probabilistic algorithmic models; and he believes that prediction qual-
ity is almost always of dominating importance. I agree with Breiman that
probability modelling is certainly not mandatory, which runs counter to the
naive idea that finding the true model is the ultimate aim of statistics. On
the other hand, Breiman (2001) and much work from the machine learn-
ing community seem to reduce aims of modelling to prediction quality as
all-dominating issue, which neglects the role of models for communication
and building understanding, even though it is probably valid to state that
prediction quality is very often at least implied by the aim of analysis.
Also there are doubts to what extent prediction quality for future events can
be reliably assessed. For example, there is the possibility that the process
of interest in the future may change, and a transparent model with solid
subject matter justification may be more easily adapted, as Hand (2006)
argues. Cross-validation and other methods for assessing prediction quality
imply i.i.d. repetition, which may be problematic, see above.
Another example for direct measurement of what is of interest is the objec-
tive function of k-means clustering, which directly measures the quality of
the approximation of any data point by the closest cluster centroid (more
generally, often loss functions can be constructed that formalise the aim of
analysis). If achieving a good performance in this respect is the aim of anal-
ysis (for example if clustering is used for data set size reduction before some
other analysis, and all clustered objects are replaced by the cluster centroid
in a final analysis), k-means clustering is a suitable method even in situations
that are very different from the model for which k-means is maximum like-
lihood, namely normal distributions with same spherical covariance matrix
in all clusters but different cluster means. Statisticians have argued that k-
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means often does not work well if this assumption is violated (e.g., Vermunt
(2011) in a discussion of Steinley and Brusco (2011)), but this relies on the
view that reconstructing the true model is required, which may deviate from
what is needed in practice.
(4) How stable are conclusions against modelling differently? The ultimate
answer to the question how we can be sure that a model is appropriate for
the situation we want to analyse is that we cannot be. Breiman (2001) men-
tioned the “multiplicity of good models”in line with Tukey (1997); Davies
(2014), and different “good” models may lead to contradicting conclusions.
On top of that, research hypotheses may be operationalised in different ways,
using different measurements, different data collection and so on. There is
no way to be sure of a scientific claim backed up by a statistical result based
on the naive idea that the model is true and the method is optimal. In order
to arrive at reliable conclusions, science will need to establish the stability of
the conclusions against different ways of operationalising the problem. This
is basically the same way in which we as individual human beings arrive at a
stable concept of the world, as far as it concerns us; after lots of experiences,
looking at something from different angles in different situations, using dif-
ferent senses, communicating with others about it etc., we start to rely on
our “understanding” of something. In the same way, every single analysis
only gives us a very restricted view of a problem, and does not suffice to
secure stability, see the discussion of “interpretative hypotheses” in Section
4.1. Currently there is talk of a “reproducibility crisis” in a number of dis-
ciplines (Fidler and Wilcox (2018)). I think that a major reason for this is
that no single analysis can establish stability, which is all too conveniently
ignored, given that researchers and their funders like to tout big meaningful
results with limited effort. Even if researchers who try to reproduce other
researchers’ work have the intention to take the very same steps of anal-
ysis described in the original work that they try to reproduce, more often
than not there are subtle differences that were not reported, like for example
data dependent selection of a methodology that the reproducer then uses
unconditionally. Any single analysis will depend on researchers’ decisions
that are rarely fully documented, could often be replaced by other decisions
that are not in any way obviously worse, and may have a strong impact on
the result. Having something confirmed by an as large as possible number
of analyses investigating the same research hypothesis of interest in different
ways is the royal road to increase the reliability of scientific results. In this I
agree with the spirit of Mayo (2018)’s “severity”, and it also resonates with
her “piecemeal testing”; a scientific claim is the more reliable, the harder
researchers have tried to falsify it and failed. Frequentism-as-model surely
does not license claims that anything substantial about the world can been
proved by rejecting a single straw man null hypothesis.
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4 Frequentism-as-model for statistical inference
Adopting frequentism-as-model as interpretation of probability does not imply that
classical methods of frequentist inference, tests, confidence intervals, or estimators
have to be used. It may also be combined with Bayesian inference, see Section
5.2. However, the classical methods of statistical inference have valid frequentism-
as-model interpretations, and I believe that understanding these interpretations
properly will help to apply the methods in a meaningful and useful way. Therefore
I disagree with recent calls to abandon significance testing or even frequentist
inference as a whole (Wasserstein et al. (2019)). in Section 4.1 I introduce the key
concept of “interpretational equivalence”. Section 4.2 is about the frequentism-
as-model interpretation of these methods. Section 4.3 is devoted to the issue of
model assumptions for frequentist inference, and how these are important given
that they cannot literally be fulfilled.
4.1 Interpretational equivalence, stability, and robustness
The question how stable our conclusions are as raised in Section 3.2 does not
only depend on models, methods, and the data, but also on the conclusions that
are drawn from them, i.e., the interpretation of the results by the researcher. A
helpful concept to clarify things is “interpretational equivalence”. I call two models
“interpretationally equivalent” with respect to a researcher’s aim if her subject-
matter interpretation of what she is interested in is the same regardless of which
of the two models is true. For example, if a researcher is interested in testing
whether a certain treatment improves blood pressure based on paired data before
and after treatment, she will in all likelihood draw the same conclusion, namely
that the treatment overall does not change the blood pressure, if the distribution
of differences between after and before treatment is symmetric about zero, be it
a Gaussian or a t2-distribution, for example. For her research aim, the precise
shape of the distribution is irrelevant. Comparing two models with expectation
zero, one of which is symmetric whereas the other one is not, this is not so clear;
the treatment changes the shape of the distribution, and whether this can be seen
as an improvement may depend on the precise nature of the change. For example,
consider the model
0.99N (µ∗, σ2) + 0.01 ∗ δ100, (1)
δx being the one-point distribution in x. The researcher may think of δ100-
distribution as modelling erroneous observations, in which case µ∗ = 0 makes
the model interpretationally equivalent to N (0, σ2), whereas for µ∗ = − 1
0.99
, de-
spite expectation zero, the researcher will interpret an average effect of lowering
the blood pressure, which the model implies for a subpopulation of 99% of people.
The importance of interpretational equivalence is that it allows to discuss what
deviations of a temporarily assumed model should be handled in which way. If
conclusions are drawn from a method involving certain model assumptions, it
would be desirable, and conclusions can be seen as stable, if the probability would
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be roughly the same that the researcher arrives at the same conclusion from the
same data if data are actually generated by an interpretationally equivalent model
other than the assumed one. If this is not the case, it would be of interest if the
models can be told apart with good probability by the data, in which case the
data can be used to decide on which one of these models to base a data analysis.
This also applies to the decision between a specific parametric and a more general
but potentially less precise nonparametric approach, see Section 4.3.
The concept also clarifies the issue that large samples reject point null hypothe-
ses too easily. Considering a µ = 0 null hypothesis, a model with µ 6= 0 but a
very small absolute value will lead to a rejection of µ = 0 with a large probability
for large n. This is a problem if and only if models with, say, |µ| < ǫ, ǫ > 0 are
considered interpretationally equivalent to the model with µ = 0, in other words,
if a difference as small as ǫ is considered substantially irrelevant. If this can be
specified, the question whether values of µ with |µ| < ǫ are in the corresponding
confidence interval, or what severity the test achieves ruling out |µ| < ǫ, see Mayo
(2018), is more relevant than whether a test of µ = 0 is significant.
Being concerned about interpretational equivalence of models is an entry point
for robust methods, which are designed for dealing with the possibility that a
nominal model is violated in ways that are hard to diagnose but may make a dif-
ference regarding analysis. Robustness theory is about limiting changes in results
under small changes of the modelled processes. An issue with standard robustness
theory is that it is often implied that “contamination” of a distribution should
not have an influence of the results, whereas in practice the contamination may
actually be meaningful. To decide this is a matter of assessing interpretational
equivalence. Frequentism-as-model acknowledges that desirable behaviour of a
statistical method is not just something “objective” but depends on how we in-
terpret and assign meaning to differences between distributions. Robustness is
helpful where the reduced sensitivity of robust methods to certain changes in the
data or model takes effect where the changes are indeed interpreted as meaningless
relative to the aim of analysis; for example there needs to be a decision whether
in model (1) what correspond to the quantity of interest is rather the mean of the
distribution, or rather the µ∗. In some applications it is inappropriate to use a
method of which the results may not change much when replacing up to half of
the data, namely where the resulting processes are considered as interpretationally
very different, but in any case comparing the results of such a method with a more
“sensitive” non-robust one may allow for a more differentiated perception of what
is going on than does every single method on its own.
4.2 Significance tests, frequentist inference
Statistical hypothesis tests have become very controversial (e.g., Wasserstein et al.
(2019)), but the interpretation of tests from the position of frequentism-as-model
is rather straightforward. They address to what extent models are compatible with
the data in the sense formalised by the test statistic. For simplicity, I mostly call
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models “compatible” or “incompatible” with data, but in fact compatibility is of
course gradual, as expressed by p-values. Obviously a non-rejection cannot be an
indication that the model is in fact true, but it means the absence of evidence in
the data that reality is different in the way implied by the test statistic, making it
impossible to claim such evidence. Sometimes tests, particularly two-sided tests,
are criticised because “point null hypotheses are usually scientifically implausible
and hence only a straw man” (e.g., Rice et al. (2020)), but then a parametric
model allowing for any parameter value cannot be “really true” anyway, so that
for the same reason for which the point null hypothesis (H0) is “implausible”, the
whole parametric family is implausible as well, but that does not stop inference
about it from being informative and useful, see Section 3.2. What a test can do
is neither to confirm H0 as true, nor to allow to infer any specific alternative in
case of rejection. A two-sided test should be run if compatibility of the data with
H0 is a possibility of interest; even then it may not be the method of choice if the
sample size is too large, see Section 4.1.
Often significance tests are presented implying that a rejection of the H0 is
meaningful whereas a non-rejection is not. Above I have explained the meaning
of a non-rejection in frequentism-as-model; the meaning of rejection is a more
complex issue. Obviously, rejection of the H0 does not imply that there is evidence
in favour of any particular model that is not part of the H0. On the positive side,
a rejection of the H0 gives information about the “direction” of deviation from
the H0, which can and mostly should be substantiated using confidence intervals
as sets of compatible parameter values, and particularly data visualisation for
exploring how this plays out without relying on the specified model.
Consider a one-sample t-test of the H0 : µ = 0 regarding N (µ, σ
2) against
µ > 0. The test statistic T is the difference between the sample mean and µ = 0
standardised by the sample standard deviation. Sticking to model-based thinking
while not implying that N (µ, σ2) is true, rejection of the H0 can be interpreted
as providing evidence in favour of any distribution of the two samples for which
a larger value of T is observed with larger probability than under H0, compared
with the H0. We do not only have evidence against H0; we also learn that the
problem with H0 is that µ = 0 is most likely too low, which is informative.
In many situations in which the one-sample t-test is used, the user is interested
in testing µ = 0 or rather its interpretational meaning, but not in the distributional
shape N (µ, σ2), which just enables her to run a test of µ = 0. If in fact there were
a true distribution, which of course we can consider, in the “as if”-model world,
which isn’t N (µ, σ2) with any specific µ or σ2, it is not clear in a straightforward
manner what would correspond to µ. It may be the expected value, but in a model
such as (1) it may well be seen as the µ∗ that governs 99% of the observations.
In any case, there are distributions that could be considered as interpretationally
equivalent to the actual H0. Any distribution symmetric about zero is in most
applications of t-tests interpretationally equivalent to the H0, meaning that if
indeed a distribution different from N (µ, σ2) but still symmetric about µ = 0 were
true, it would be desirable that the probability to reject H0 would be as low as if
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H0 were true.
One can then ask how likely it is to reject the H0 under a model that is not
formally part of the H0, but interpretationally equivalent. For the one-sample t-
test, assuming existing variances, many distributions interpretationally equivalent
to N (µ, σ2) are asymptotically equivalent as well, and results in Cressie (1980)
and some own simulations indicate that it is very hard if not impossible even
in finite samples to generate an error probability of more than 7% for rejecting
an interpretationally true H0 with a nominal level of 5%, even if the underlying
distribution is skew and µ is taken to be the expected value, meaning that testing
at a slightly smaller nominal level than the maximum error probability that we
want to achieve will still allow for the intended interpretation.
But the situation becomes much worse under some other deviations from the
model assumptions, particularly positive dependence between observations, which
increases the variation of T and may lead to significant T and increased type I error
probability very easily, also in situations that are interpretationally equivalent
to the H0. Consider an example in which the expected change of the turnover
generated by a salesperson after attending a sales seminar is of interest in order to
evaluate the quality of the instructor. If all salespersons in the sample attend the
sales seminar together, they may learn something useful from talking with each
other about sales strategies, even if what the instructor does itself is useless.
What is required in order to achieve a reliable conclusion is just what was
discussed in Section 3.2. The general question to address is whether a rejection of
H0 could have been caused by something interpretationally equivalent to the H0,
in which case the conclusion could not be relied upon. The questions to ask are:
(1) is there any evidence in the data that such a thing may have happened, (2) is
there any subject matter knowledge that suggests this (e.g., salespersons may have
learnt from each other rather than from the seminar), (3) does the meaning of the
test statistic correspond to what is of interest, and (4) is it feasible to run further
analyses, with the same or other data, that can confirm the conclusion? (4) is im-
portant because even the best efforts to use (1) and (2) will not be able to remove
all doubt. Models are always conceivable that can cause trouble but cannot be
distinguished from the nominal model based on the data, and thinking about the
subject matter may miss something important. (3) is in my view a very important
issue that is not usually appreciated. Tests are usually derived using optimality
considerations under the nominal model, but this does not imply that they are
optimal for distinguishing the “interpretational H0” from the “interpretational al-
ternative”. In many cases at least they make some good sense, but a model like
(1) may lead them astray. The full interpretational H0 and the interpretational
alternative will normally be too complex to derive any optimal test from them,
but the form of the test statistic itself suggests what kinds of distributions the
test actually distinguishes. This should be in line with what is interpreted as the
difference of interest between H0 and the alternative. At least under a point H0,
the distribution of any test statistic can be simulated (if the H0 is a set of distri-
butions, parametric bootstrap can be used, if potentially involving a certain bias).
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Assuming that rejection happens for large values of the test statistic, it implicitly
defines the interpretational H0 and the interpretational alternative distinguished
by the test as the set of distributions for which the test statistic is expected low,
and the set of distributions for which it is expected larger, respectively. In many
situations a nonstandard test statistic may be better suitable than what is optimal
under a simple nominal model (see Hennig and Lin (2015) for an example).
Bayesians often argue against frequentist inference by stating that the proba-
bilities that characterise the performance of frequentist inference methods such as
test error and confidence interval coverage probabilities are pre-data probabilities,
and that they do not tell the researcher about the probability for their inferences
to be true after having seen the data. One example is that a 95%-confidence in-
terval for the mean of a Gaussian distribution in a situation in which the mean is
constrained to be larger than zero may consist of negative values only, meaning
that after having seen the data the researcher can be sure that the true value is
not in the confidence interval. This is a problem if the coverage probability of the
confidence interval is indeed interpreted as a probability for the true parameter
value to be in the confidence interval, which is a misinterpretation; the coverage
probability is a performance characteristic of the confidence interval pre-data, as-
suming the model. From the point of view of frequentism-as-model, this is not a
big problem, because there is no such thing as a true model or a true parameter
value, and therefore a probability for any model to be true is misleading anyway,
although it can be given a meaning within a model in which the prior distribution
is also interpreted in a frequentism-as-model sense, see Section 5.2. In practice, if
in fact a confidence interval is found that does not contain any admissible value,
this means that either the restriction of the parameter space that makes all the
values in the confidence interval impossible can be questioned, or that a truly
atypical sample was observed. Davies (1995) defined “adequacy regions” that are
basically confidence sets defined based on several statistics together (such as the
mean or median, an extreme value index, and a discrepancy between distributional
shapes; appropriately adjusting confidence levels), that can by definition in princi-
ple rule out all distributions of an “assumed” parametric family, meaning that no
member of the family is compatible with the data given the combination of chosen
statistics. Normally confidence intervals are interpreted as giving a set of truth
candidate values assuming that the parametric model is true; but if that assump-
tion is dropped from the interpretation and it is just a set of models compatible
with the data defined by parameter values within a certain parametric family, it
is possible that the whole family is not compatible with the data.
Overall I suspect that the biggest problem with interpreting standard frequen-
tist inference is that many of the people who use it want to make stronger claims,
and want to have bigger certainty, than the probability setup that they use allows.
An example for this is the ubiquity of implicit or explicit claims that the null hy-
pothesis is true in case that it was not rejected by a test. Interpreting the results of
classical frequentist inference assuming the truth of the model will generally lead
to overinterpretation. According to frequentism-as-model, classical frequentist in-
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ference allows compatibility and incompatibility statements of models with data.
As far as the models are used to make substantive statements, such compatibility
assessment is of course of interest. What exactly can be learnt from this depends
on the analysed situation as well as on what the researcher sees as interpretation-
ally equivalent in that situation. From the point of view of frequentism-as-model,
research about the expected variation of results under interpretationally equivalent
models would be desirable, acknowledging that interpretational equivalence may
mean different things in different applications. Deciding on a parametric model
and from then on ignoring that other models can be compatible with the data as
well will easily lead to overinterpretation.
4.3 Model assumptions
A standard statement regarding statistical methods is that these are based on
model assumptions, and that the model assumptions have to be fulfilled for a
method to be applied. This is misleading. Model assumptions cannot be fulfilled
in reality, because models are thought constructs and operate on a domain different
from observer-independent reality. For this reason they cannot even be approxi-
mately true, in a well defined sense, because no distance between the unformalised
“underlying real truth” and the model can be defined, although, following Davies,
the approximation notion can be well defined comparing observed data to a model.
What is the role of model assumptions then? There are theorems that grant
a certain performance of the method, sometimes optimal, sometimes just good in
a certain sense, under the model assumptions. The model assumptions are not
required for applying the method, but for securing the performance achieved in
theory. The theory can be helpful to choose a method, and some theory leads to the
development of methods, but the theoretical performance can never be granted in
reality. This does not mean that the performance will be bad whenever the model
assumptions are not fulfilled. In fact, some aspects of the model assumptions
are usually almost totally irrelevant for the performance, such as the application
of methods derived from models for continuous data to data that is rounded to,
say, two decimal paces. Interpretational equivalence is an important concept also
in this respect, because optimally methods would not only distinguish what is
deemed relevant to distinguish by the researcher under the model assumptions,
e.g., a certain H0 and its nominal alternative, but they would lead to largely the
same results for interpretationally equivalent distributions that do not fulfill the
model assumptions. As far as this is the case, the corresponding model assumption
is irrelevant.
It makes sense, at first sight, to think that the method will be appropriate if
the assumed model is a good model, i.e., if reality looks very much like it. This
itself can be modelled, meaning that one can look at the performance of a method
in a situation in which the assumed method does not hold, but a somewhat similar
model, which can be formalised using dissimilarity measures between distributions.
This has been considered in robust statistics (Hampel et al. (1986), “qualitative
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robustness” in particular) with the unsettling result that the performance of some
classical statistical methods can decline strongly in arbitrarily small neighbour-
hoods of the assumed model. As a consequence, more robust methods have been
developed, i.e., methods with a more stable performance in close neighbourhoods.
This is surely valuable progress, but on one hand it does not change the fact that
models can be set up that cannot be rejected by any amount of data, and that
can annihilate the performance of any method, e.g., using irregular dependence
and/or non-identity structures, so full safety cannot even be had in the modelled
world, let alone the real one. On the other hand, the situation is not quite as
hopeless as this may suggest. Usually bad results about standard methods are
worst case results, very often regarding extreme outliers, and it is often plausible,
from checks, visualisation, or subject matter considerations, that the worst case
does not occur. To argue against detrimental dependence or non-identity struc-
tures is much harder, and the best that can be done in this respect is looking for
conceivable reasons for trouble, using a suitable method if no such reason comes to
mind, and then hope that the world will behave when acting based on the result.
Science makes mistakes and is hopefully open-minded enough to correct itself in
case of bad outcomes.
Mayo (2018) (Sec. 4.8-4.11) and others argue that model assumptions can and
should be tested. Whereas the truth of the model cannot be secured, much can
indeed be found out about whether a model is adequate for a purpose. But model
checking has a number of issues. The first one is that if a certain model assumption
turns out to be compatible with the data, it does not mean that other models that
may lead to different results are ruled out. Misspecification testing cannot secure
robustness of results against models that cannot be excluded.
A second issue is that if a method is used conditionally on passing a model
misspecification test for checking a model assumption, the distribution of the data
that eventually go into the method becomes conditional on passing, and this will
normally violate the model assumptions, even if they were not violated before.
Particularly it will make observations dependent even if they were not dependent
before, because if for example n− 1 observations are on the borderline for passing
the misspecification test, the nth observation has to fit well for passing. I called
this “goodness-of-fit (or misspecification) paradox” in Hennig (2007). In many
situations this will not change error probabilities associated with the model-based
method strongly, meaning that in case the model was true before misspecification
testing, not much harm is done.
On the other hand, in case that the model assumption is violated in a problem-
atic way, the distribution conditionally under passing a misspecification test will
often not make the method work better, and sometimes even worse than before
testing; keep in mind that just because the misspecification test does not reject the
model assumption, it does not mean that it is fulfilled. Shamsudheen and Hennig
(2019) reviewed work investigating the actual performance of procedures that in-
volve a misspecification test for one or more model assumptions before running a
method that is based on these model assumptions, looking at data that originally
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fulfilled or did not fulfill the model assumption. Occasionally a combined proce-
dure was investigated in which, in case of the violation of a model assumption,
a method with lighter assumptions is used. The philosophy of such work, which
is in line with frequentism-as-model, is that the key question is not whether the
model assumptions are really fulfilled, but what the performance of such combined
procedures is in several situations, compared to both the model-based and the less
model-based (often nonparametric) test. The results are mixed, depend on the
specific combinations of tests, and surprisingly many authors advise against mis-
specification testing based on their results (e.g., Fay and Proschan (2010): “The
choice between t- and Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney decision rules should not be based
on a test of normality”). Whereas formally requiring lighter model assumptions,
the use of nonparametric methods only pays off if the probability to arrive at a con-
clusion that is interpretationally in line with a modelled truth is better than for a
competing parametric method for most models compatible with data and existing
knowledge; traded off potentially against the expected sizes of “interpretational
differences”, as far as these can be specified. This is not always the case.
Shamsudheen and Hennig (2019) showed a theoretical result that presents com-
bined procedures in a somewhat more positive light. They looked at the overall
performance of combined methods in a setup where datasets could be, with a cer-
tain probability λ, generated by the assumed model, and with probability 1−λ by
a distribution that could cause trouble for the model-based method (see Section
5.2 for using such a “Bayesian” setup in connection with frequentism-as-model).
Under certain assumptions for the involved methods they showed that for a range
of values of λ the combined procedure beats both involved tests, the model-based
one and the one not requiring the specific model assumption, regarding power,
even if not winning for λ = 0 and λ = 1, which is what authors of previous work
had investigated.
The surprisingly pessimistic assessment of misspecification testing by authors
who investigated its effect may be due to the fact that most available misspecifi-
cation tests test the model assumption against alternatives that are either easy to
handle or very general, whereas little effort has been spent on developing tests that
rule out specific violations of the model assumptions that are known to affect the
performance of the model-based method strongly, i.e., leading to different conclu-
sions for interpretationally equivalent models, or same conclusions for models that
are interpretationally very different. Such tests would be specifically connected to
the model-based method with which they are meant to be combined, and to the
assessment of interpretational equivalence.
Furthermore, as already mentioned, not everything can be tested on data. E.g.,
many conceivable dependence structures do not lead to patterns that can be used
to reject independence. For example, it may occasionally but not regularly happen
that one observation determines or changes the distribution of the next one. Think
of psychological tests in which sometimes a test person discusses the test with
another participant who has not yet been tested, and where such communication
can have a strong influence on the result.
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Frequentism-as-model could inspire work that looks at performance of methods
involving model assumptions and misspecification testing under all kinds of mod-
els that seem realistic, including Bayesian combinations of different models with
different probabilities. Generally, regarding methodological research, a researcher
adhering to frequentism-as-model will always be interested in the performance of
method that are supposedly model-based under situations in which the model as-
sumptions are violated, knowing that model assumptions can never be relied upon,
and that looking at other models is the only way to investigate what happens then.
This is in the tradition of robust statistics, but with less focus on worst cases and
more focus on interpretational equivalence for deciding what outcome would actu-
ally be desirable. The cases that are really the worst ones are hopeless under any
approach, and even the best statistics cannot always save the day.
5 Frequentism-as-model and Bayesian statistics
Most Bayesians interpret their probabilities epistemically, and this is incompatible
with frequentism-as-model. This does not imply that the epistemic interpretation
is in my view in any way wrong, but I do not agree with the claim of some, including
de Finetti, that epistemic probabilities make frequentist probabilities superfluous,
see Section 5.1. Frequentism-as-model as interpretation of probability is not com-
mitted to specific methodology such as tests and confidence intervals. It is also
compatible with Bayesian methods, as long as they are interpreted accordingly,
see Section 5.2.
The distinction between compatibility logic (i.e., asking whether certain prob-
ability models are compatible with the data as addressed by tests and confidence
intervals) and Bayesian inverse probability logic, in which the central outcomes
are the posterior probabilities resulting from conditioning the prior on the data,
is not fully in line with the distinction between epistemic and aleatory probabil-
ity, but currently a matter of hot debate. The 2016 ASA-Statement on p-values
(Wasserstein and Lazar (2016)) has a single positive message on p-values, besides
a number of negative ones: “p-values can indicate how incompatible the data are
with a specified statistical model.” Wasserstein et al. (2019) go further and ask
to “abandon statistical significance”, opening a Special Issue of The American
Statistician containing a bewildering variety of alternative proposals. Many of the
authors argue from an inverse probability logic, but this has problems that in my
view are similarly severe. Section 5.3 compares the two logics.
5.1 Epistemic probability
The term “epistemic probability” refers to interpretations of probability that ex-
plain them as rational measures of uncertainty of a claim. They can roughly be
distinguished in objectivist (logical) and subjectivist epistemic probabilities, re-
spectively (see Gillies (2000); Galavotti (2005) for an overview). According to
epistemic interpretations of probability, a priori existing probability assignments
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are modified by the evidence. Mostly this is done using Bayes’s theorem, and some
people identify epistemic probability with Bayesian statistics, although there are
epistemic approaches that are not Bayesian, and Bayesian statistics can be com-
bined with non-epistemic interpretations of probability, see Section 5.2.
The frequentist interpretation of probability is often rejected by advocates of
epistemic probabilities for its obvious problems to establish an existence of fre-
quentist probabilities in the observer-independent world. De Finetti and other
advocates of subjectivist epistemic probability hold that whereas objective proba-
bility does not exist in the real world, degrees of belief of a person do exist, and are
therefore more worthy targets of probability modelling. Given that I do not locate
frequentist probabilities in the observer-independent world, why would I not go all
the way to a subjectivist position? The reason is the following. Personal degrees
of belief may exist or not. In any case, probability modelling is still modelling
as discussed in Section 3.1. It operates on a domain different from what is mod-
elled, and as there are issues with the connection of frequentist probabilities to
real phenomena involving frequencies, there are issues of similar gravity with the
connection of epistemic probabilities to subjective degrees of belief. I just mention
two of them.
1. Empirically observed behaviour of persons violates the probability axioms
(e.g., Kahneman et al. (1982)), so arguably epistemic probabilities do not
model existing degrees of belief as far as they are observable. Defenders of
epistemic probability argue that what empirical probabilities model is not
how human behaviour is, but how degrees of uncertainty should be. But
mixing probability axioms with otherwise unconstrained prior probability
assessments produces a strange compromise of normative and empirical rea-
soning that looks artificially constructed rather than really existing in any
conceivable sense. The only credible claim for existence is probably that a
Bayesian researcher can say that she consciously adopts the resulting prob-
abilities.
2. As is the case with frequentist probabilities, epistemic probabilities are used
in a simplifying and idealising way. As elaborated in Section 2.2, frequen-
tists need to rely on i.i.d. models not because they believe that the modelled
process is really i.i.d., but rather in order to construct the kind of repetition
that makes model-based learning from data possible. For the same reason,
epistemic Bayesians normally rely on exchangeability (or a generalised con-
cept for more complex situations, as was discussed for i.i.d. in Section 2.2).
But when applied to real degrees of belief, the exchangeability assumption
seems counterintuitive. In particular, once a process is assessed as exchange-
able by an epistemic Bayesian, using standard Bayesian reasoning there is
no way to learn anymore that the exchangeability assumption is not in line
with the process to be modelled. I would think it rational, even if initially
there is no reason to think that the order of observations matters regarding
the probability of a sequence, to change that assessment if for example in
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a binary process 50 ones, then 50 zeroes, then 50 ones, then 23 zeroes are
observed. Surely this should convince the subjectivist that observing a zero
next is now more likely than it was in the middle of a run of ones! But if
initially runs were assessed to be exchangeable, this is not possible.
The point that I want to get across here is not that subjectivist epistemic proba-
bility involving exchangeability is in any way “wrong” or “useless”. In fact I am
a pluralist, I can see areas where epistemic probability can be of use, and I accept
the necessity of simplification and idealisation. The point is rather that most if
not all criticism that subjectivists have about frequentism corresponds to trouble
that exists within their own approach as well, which has to do with the fact that
modelling does not match reality, be it aleatory or epistemic. Given that this is
so, and given the obvious difficulty in many cases to choose a prior distribution, it
looks attractive to model the reality of interest directly as frequentism-as-model
does, rather than a degree of belief about it.
Objectivist epistemic probability is overall not in a better position than sub-
jectivist epistemic probability. The issue with exchangeability is the same, except
that subjectivists at least have a reference, namely the person holding the prob-
ability, who could take responsibility for either choosing exchangeability or for
specifying a particular pattern deviating from it. I have not seen any discussion of
objectivist epistemic modelling involving the ability to deviate from exchangeable
assessments if the data provides strong evidence against it.
Another advantage that subjectivists have over epistemic objectivists is that
they are allowed to formalise existing but informal evidence as they see fit, whereas
it is unclear how epistemic objectivists could incorporate it. This corresponds to
the open license that frequentism-as-model grants the researcher to incorporate
subjective assessments of the situation in their models compared to traditional
frequentists or propensity theorists. In practice almost everyone does it, but many
do not admit it.
Overall I think that frequentism-as-model has something relevant to offer that
is not covered by the major streams of epistemic probability, and that for major
arguments that critics have against frequentism, corresponding arguments exist
against epistemic probability. I do not deny that epistemic probability has its
uses, but frequentism-as-model treats processes that the researchers think of as
“random” more directly, avoiding the thorny if sometimes useful issue of specifying
and justifying a prior.
5.2 Frequentism-as-model and falsificationist Bayes
Epistemic probabilities model a personal or “objective” degree of belief, not the
data generating process as such, and therefore they cannot be checked against
and falsified by the data. See Dawid (1982) for a discussion of “calibration”, i.e.,
agreement or potential mismatch between predictions based on epistemic Bayesian
probabilities and what is actually observed. Gelman and Shalizi (2013) argued
that Bayesian statistics should allow for checking the model against the data,
5 FREQUENTISM-AS-MODEL AND BAYESIAN STATISTICS 28
and interpret Bayesian models as modelling data generating processes rather than
epistemic uncertainty. This is in line with a lot of applied Bayesian work in which
the posterior distribution of the parameter is interpreted as encoding probabilities
for a certain parameters being true descriptors of the underlying data generating
process. This allows to check the model against the data and potentially to revise
it. Gelman and Hennig (2017) called it “falsificationist Bayes”.
My interpretation of it is that probabilities in falsificationist Bayes are inter-
preted in the same manner as in frequentism-as-model. The parametric model is
handled as if it describes the data generating process but can be dropped or modi-
fied if falsified by the data. The involved interpretation of probabilities is consistent
if the parameter prior is interpreted as a model of a parameter generating process
in the same way. Gelman and Shalizi (2013) stated that the prior distribution
may encode “a priori knowledge” or a “subjective degree of belief”. This seems
to mix up an epistemic interpretation of the parameter prior with an aleatory in-
terpretation of the parametric model, and it is hard to justify using them in the
same calculus. I believe that it would be better to refer to the parameter prior as
an idealistic model of a process that generates parameters for different situations
that are based on the same information, i.e., to interpret it in a frequentism-as-
model way. This is in line with the fact that Gelman in presentations sometimes
informally refers to the parameter prior as a distribution over parameters realistic
in a distribution of different situations of similar kind in which datasets can be
drawn. This is a very idealistic concept and it is probably hard to connect the
setup of parameter generation precisely to real observations. The modelling will
normally indeed rely more on belief and informal knowledge than on observation
of replicates of what is supposed to be parameter generation, but as in Section
2.1, an arbitrary amount of data can be generated from the fully specified model,
and can be compared with the observed data. Testing the parameter prior is hard.
In a standard simple Bayesian setup, it is assumed that only one parameter value
generated all observed data, so the effective sample size for checking the parameter
prior is smaller than one, because the single parameter is not even precisely ob-
served. Therefore sensitivity against prior specification will always be a concern,
but see the discussion of single-case probabilities in Section 2.2. In any case, the
parametric model can be tested in frequentist ways. In case the parameter prior
encodes valuable information about the parameter that can most suitably be en-
coded in this way, Bayesian reasoning based on such a model is clearly useful, and
open to self-correction by falsificationist logic. As for model assumptions testing
followed by traditional frequentism methods (Shamsudheen and Hennig (2019)),
it may be of interest to analyse the behaviour of Bayesian reasoning conditionally
on model checking in case of fulfilled and not fulfilled model assumptions.
A benefit of such an interpretation could be that the prior no longer either
has to be claimed to be objective or to model a specific person. It is a not nec-
essarily unique researcher’s suggestion how to imagine the parameter generating
process based on a certain amount of information, and can as such be compared
with alternatives and potentially rejected, if not by the data, then by open dis-
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cussion. As earlier, stability against different prior choices compatible with the
same information can be investigated. Models may be set up not only to formalise
most realistic processes, but also, depending on the application, worst or best case
scenarios in order to explore what range of possibilities this generates. Such things
are occasionally already done (see the Shamsudheen and Hennig (2019) example
in Section 4.3), but currently such nonstandard Bayesian practice does not seem in
line with the predominantly epistemic Bayesian philosophy. Frequentism-as-model
is in my view a more fitting philosophy for such reasoning.
5.3 Compatibility logic vs. inverse probability logic
We have seen that the distinction between a frequentist and an epistemic interpre-
tation of probability does not align perfectly with the distinction between compat-
ibility logic and Bayesian inverse probability logic. Often posterior probabilities
are interpreted as probabilities about where to find the true parameter value. The
idea of a true parameter value is a traditional frequentist one. de Finetti (1974) ar-
gued that posteriors should be interpreted regarding observable quantities such as
future observations and not regarding unobservables such as true parameter values
that may well not exist, but according to Diaconis and Skyrms (2018), de Finetti’s
Theorem implies that for a subjectivist, belief in exchangeability or a suitable gen-
eralisation of it implies belief in the existence of limiting relative frequencies, and
therefore a limiting probability distribution that can be parametrised. This could
be used to connect epistemic probability with compatibility logic, but advocates of
epistemic probability do not seem to be very interested in this. In any case, a falsi-
ficationist Bayes perspective combined with a frequentism-as-model interpretation
of probability licenses probabilistic statements about the parameter modelled as
true.
A major difference between compatibility logic and inverse probability logic
is that according to compatibility logic many models can be compatible with the
data, and the compatibility of one model does not exclude or reduce the compati-
bility of another model. Inverse probability logic distributes an overall probability
of one over the models modelled as possible, implying that a higher probability for
one model automatically decreases the probability for the others. The models are
competing for probability, so to say.
There are advantages and disadvantages of both approaches. Many Bayesians
such as Diaconis and Skyrms (2018) have pointed out that p-values and confidence
levels are regularly misinterpreted as probabilities regarding the true parameter,
because these should be the ultimate quantities of interest in statistical inference,
or so it is claimed. Inverse probability logic deals with combining different infer-
ences such as multiple testing, which creates trouble for standard compatibility
logic approaches, in a unified and coherent way. Frequentists are not only inter-
ested in compatibility, but also in estimation; finding a best model amounts to a
competition between models. A Bayesian can argue that in this case a probability
distribution over parameters provides better information about how the parame-
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ters compare and to what extent one parameter value is more likely than others.
Using confidence distributions (Xie and Singh (2013)), frequentists involving com-
patibility logic can give more detailed information about how parameters compare
as well, but Bayesians hold that a proper probability distribution is more intuitive
and less prone to misinterpretation.
On the other side, by allowing many models to be compatible with the data at
the same time, compatibility logic is more obviously in line with the attitude that
models are idealisations and not really true. Davies (1995) argued that if many
models are valid approximations for the same real situation, inverse probability
logic is inappropriate, because if for example N (0, 1) is a reasonable approximation
of the truth, N (10−10, 1) is a reasonable approximation as well, whereas accord-
ing to inverse probability logic any two models compete for a part of the unit
probability mass.
Furthermore, it may seem unfair to criticise tests and confidence intervals based
on misinterpretations. Arguably many users do not only want to know the proba-
bility for certain parameter values to be true, which indeed tempts them to misin-
terpret confidence levels and p-values. But arguably they also want this probability
to be objective and independent of prior assessments, which to make up they have
a hard time. This combination is not licensed by any properly understood philoso-
phy of statistics, and ultimately statisticians need to accept that their job is often
not to give the users what they want, but rather to defy wrong expectations.
The role of the prior distribution in inverse probability logic is a major distinc-
tion between the two approaches. Bayesians argue that the prior is a good and
very useful vehicle to incorporate prior information. Actually prior information
enters frequentist modelling as well (see earlier sections), but the Bayesian prior
is still an additional tool on top of the options that frequentists have to involve
information. But the requirement to set up a prior can also be seen as a major
problem with inverse probability logic, given that prior information does not nor-
mally come in the form of prior probabilities, and that it is actually in most cases
very difficult to translate existing information into the required form. It is not
an accident that a very large number of applied Bayesian publications come with
no or very scarce subject matter justification of the prior, and in most cases the
prior information is very clearly compatible with many different potential priors,
with comprehensive sensitivity analysis rarely done. If the sample size is large
enough for the prior to lose most of its influence, one may wonder why to bother
having one. The question whether there is prior information that is meant to have
an impact on the analysis and can be encoded convincingly in the form of a prior
distribution is a key issue for deciding whether inverse probability or compatibility
logic will be more promising in a given application of statistics.
Falsificationist Bayes combines the two by applying inverse probability logic
within a Bayesian model, of which the compatibility with the data should also be
investigated. Gelman et al. (1996) emphasise that the posterior distribution of the
parameter is conditional on the truth of the model, and according to frequentism-
as-model a researcher can interpret results temporarily as if this were the case,
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without ignoring that this is just a thought construct and that many other models
are compatible as well. This differs from the epistemic probability interpretation,
where the “truth of the model” is not a matter of mechanisms in the real world, but
rather of the degrees of belief of the analyst, and the possibility that the analyst’s
degrees of belief are not properly reflected by the model is rarely discussed.
Frequentism-as-model allows to interpret the parameter prior in falsificationist
Bayes in a way that requires neither to mix epistemic and frequentist meanings of
probability, nor to demand that the prior corresponds to an in principle infinitely
repeatable data generating process. The Achilles heel of this is that in a standard
situation, based on a single realisation that is not even directly observable, the
potential to check the parameter prior against the data is very weak. The prior
still needs to be convincingly defended in other ways, and sensitivity analysis is
certainly desirable.
6 Conclusion
It may seem to be my core message that models are models and as such different
from reality. This is of course commonplace, and agreed by many if not all statisti-
cians, although it rarely influences applied statistical analyses or even discussions
about the foundations of statistics.
Here are some less obvious implications:
• The usual way of talking about model assumptions, namely that they “have
to be fulfilled”, is misleading. The aim of model assumption checking is
not to make sure that they are fulfilled, but rather to rule out issues that
misguide the interpretation of the results. Combining model assumption
checking and analyses chosen conditionally on the model checking results
can itself be modelled and analysed, and depending on what exactly is done,
it may or may not turn out to work well.
• There are always lots of models compatible with the data. Some of these can
be favoured or excluded by plausibility considerations, prior information, or
by the data, but some irregular ones have to be excluded simply because
inference would be hopeless if they were correct.
• Model assessment based on the data involves decisions about “in what way to
look”, i.e., what model deviations are relevant. Whether a model is compat-
ible with the data cannot be decided independently of such considerations.
• Choosing a model implies decisions to ignore certain aspects of reality, e.g.,
differences between the conditions under which observations modelled as
i.i.d. were gathered. These decisions should be transparent and open for
discussion.
• Consideration of interpretational equivalence, i.e., what different models
would be interpreted in the same or different way regarding the subject
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matter, are important in order to investigate robustness and stability, i.e., to
what extent different models compatible with the data would lead to results
on the same data that have a different meaning.
• Frequentism-as-model is compatible with both compatibility and inverse
probability logic. A key to decide which one to prefer is to ask whether
the parameter prior distribution required for inverse probability logic can be
used to add valuable information in a convincing way. The parameter prior
itself can not normally be checked against the data with satisfactory power.
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